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Abstract 
 Over	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  the	  European	  Union	  has	  considerably	  extended	  the	   focus	   on	   external	   policies	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   geographical	   presence	   and	  aim	   of	   activities.	   As	   a	   global	   actor,	   the	   EU	   faces	   complex	   and	   uncertain	  security	   issues	   and,	   consequently,	   a	   high	   demand	   to	   become	   more	  coherent	  and	  effective	   in	  terms	  of	  strategic	  approaches.	  As	  highlighted	  in	  the	  EU	  Security	  Strategy,	  the	  EU	  has	  come	  a	  long	  way	  improving	  the	  use	  of	  the	   appropriate	   instruments.	   The	   purpose	   of	   this	   paper	   is	   to	   offer	   an	  analysis	   of	   the	   EU's	   growing	   credibility	   as	   a	   crisis	   manager	   in	   conflict	  situations.	  In	  order	  to	  prove	  this	  point,	  a	  discussion	  about	  the	  dynamics	  of	  EU	   interventions	  will	  be	  conducted	  together	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  different	  factors	   interacting	   in	   a	   crisis	   context.	   In	   particular,	   the	   cases	   of	   Georgia	  and	  Ukraine	  will	  be	  the	  main	  objective	  of	  investigation.	  In	  fact,	  these	  case	  studies	   underline	   strengths	   and	   weaknesses	   of	   the	   EU,	   focusing	   on	   the	  capacity	   to	   respond	   to	   potential	   shocks	   and	   to	   activate	   early	   warning	  systems.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  study,	  a	  final	  overview	  will	  clarify	  how	  a	  more	  coherent	   European	   engagement	   could	   develop	   essential	   capabilities	   to	  deal	  with	  new	  challenges	  and	  effectively	  impact	  on	  conflict	  scenarios,	  via	  a	  comprehensive	   approach	   under	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   European	   External	  Action	  Service.	  	  	  
Introduction	  
	  Over	   the	   past	   two	   decades,	   the	   European	   Union	   (EU)	   has	   considerably	  
extended	   the	   focus	   on	   external	   policies	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   geographical	  presence	  and	  aim	  of	  activities:	  in	  fact,	  the	  uncertain	  security	  environment	  rising	  from	  the	  ashes	  of	  the	  Berlin	  wall	  is	  characterised	  by	  several	  complex	  challenges.	   As	   a	   global	   actor,	   the	   EU	   faces	   the	   need	   to	   become	   more	  coherent	   and	   effective	   in	   terms	   of	   strategic	   approaches	   and,	   of	   course,	  capabilities	  development	  in	  crisis	  management. In	   2003,	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   European	   Security	   Strategy	   (ESS)	  represented	  a	  very	  important	  step	  forward	  headed	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  identification	   of	   security	   challenges	   (Council	   of	   the	   European	   Union,	  2003).	   Moreover,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   underline	   that	   security	   is	   now	  considered	   not	   only	   as	   a	   global	   concern	   but	   as	   a	   precondition	   for	  development	   and,	   also,	   the	   concept	   itself	   of	   security	   has	   changed	   to	  include	  multiple	   types	   of	   threats	   beyond	  war	   and	  military	   conflicts.	   For	  these	  reasons,	  a	  comprehensive	  approach	   is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  key	  asset	  to	   tackle	   the	   complex,	   multi-­‐actor	   and	   multidimensional	   crises	   and	  growing	   security	   threats	   of	   today	   and	   tomorrow	   (ESS,	   2003).	   The	   EU	  disposes	   of	   a	   unique	   array	   of	   instruments	   to	   help	   promote	   peace	   and	  security	  where	  needed.	  As	   laid	  down	  in	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty,	  preserving	  peace,	  preventing	  conflicts	  from	   erupting	   into	   violence	   and	   strengthening	   international	   security	  (Article	  21)	  are	  among	  the	  principal	  aims	  of	  the	  external	  action	  of	  the	  EU.	  In	  particular,	   in	  2011,	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  underlined	  that	  “preventing	   conflicts	   and	   relapses	   into	   conflicts,	   in	   accordance	   with	  international	   law,	   is	   a	   primary	   objective	   of	   the	   EU’s	   external	   action,	   in	  which	   it	   could	   take	   a	   leading	   role	   acting	   in	   conjunction	   with	   its	   global,	  regional,	   national	   and	   local	   partners”	   (Council	   of	   the	   European	   Union,	  2011). Also,	   the	   Council	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   asserts	   that	   in	   addition	   to	  continuing	  with	   civilian	  missions	   and	  military	   operations,	   the	   EU	   has	   to	  improve	   its	   ability	   to	   foster	   civilian-­‐military	   cooperation	   and	   to	   use	   the	  Common	   Security	   and	   Defence	   Policy	   (CSDP)	   as	   part	   of	   coherent	   and	  comprehensive	  EU	  action,	  which	  should	  also	  include	  a	  wide	  and	  variegated	  range	   of	   political,	   diplomatic,	   legal,	   development,	   trade	   and	   economic	  instruments. The	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon,	  moreover,	  represents	  an	  opportunity	  for	  reinforcing	  this	   comprehensive	   approach.	   As	   the	   European	   External	   Action	   Service	  (EEAS)	   becomes	   operational	   under	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   High	  
Representative	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   for	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	   Security	  Policy,	   who	   is	   also	   Vice	   President	   of	   the	   Commission,	   the	   Treaty's	  implementation	  will	  aim	  to	  facilitate	  and	  promote	  effectiveness	  of	  policies	  and	   instruments	   in	   a	   more	   coherent	   and	   strategic	   manner,	   in	   order	   to	  address	   the	   whole	   cycle,	   from	   preparedness	   and	   preventative	   action;	  through	   crisis	   response	   and	  management,	   including	   stabilisation,	   peace-­‐making	   and	   peace-­‐keeping;	   to	   peace-­‐building,	   recovery,	   reconstruction	  and	  a	  return	  to	  longer-­‐term	  development.	  	  
The	  case	  of	  Georgia	  as	  a	  turning	  point	  
	  The	   Caucasus	   region	   has	   strategic	   significance	   to	   the	   EU.	   In	   2003,	   as	  already	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  ESS	  highlighted	  that	  “frozen	  conflicts,	  which	  also	   persist	   on	   our	   borders,	   threaten	   regional	   stability	   (...)	   and	   pose	  problems	  for	  Europe”	  and	  requested	  that	  EU	  “should	  take	  a	  stronger	  and	  more	  active	  interest	   in	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  Southern	  Caucasus”.	  Also,	  the	  relationship	   began	   to	   grow	   closer	   after	   the	   inclusion	   of	   Georgia	   in	   the	  European	  Neighbourhood	  Policy	  (ENP)	  in	  2004	  and	  the	  restatement	  of	  EU	  commitment	   to	   contributing	   “to	   support	   efforts	   to	   prevent	   and	   resolve	  conflicts	   as	  well	   as	   post	   conflict	   rehabilitation	  with	   the	   two	   secessionist	  regions,	   Abkhazia	   and	   South	   Ossetia”.	   Later,	   Georgia	   (together	   with	  Belarus,	  Moldova,	   Ukraine,	   Armenia	   and	   Azerbaijan)	   became	   part	   of	   the	  new	  Eastern	  Partnership	  (EaP)	   launched	  in	  Prague	   in	  May	  2009	  (Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  2009). In	   spite	   of	   these	   commitments,	   the	   EU’s	   impact	   in	   Georgia	   can	   be	  considered	   as	   negligible	   until	   the	   7th	   of	   August,	   2008	  when	   Georgia	   and	  Russia	  clashed	  in	  a	  five-­‐day	  war	  after	  Georgia	  sent	  troops	  to	  South	  Ossetia	  in	   the	   attempt	   to	   regain	   control	   over	   the	   separatist	   region.	   According	   to	  some	   scholars,	   this	   event	   was	   only	   the	   last	   one	   of	   a	   long	   series	   in	   an	  unfavourable	  context	  for	  Georgia	  (Cornell	  and	  Starr, 2009).	  	  It	  all	  started	  after	  Kosovo’s	  declaration	  of	  independence	  in	  February	  of	  the	  same	   year.	   Its	   eventual	   recognition	   by	   several	   of	   the	   EU’s	   (then)	   27	  member	   states,	   created	   an	   advantageous	   precedent	   for	   Russia.	   Also,	  Georgia’s	   aspiration	   to	  become	  part	  of	  NATO	  and	  NATO’s	  offer	   to	   a	  path	  toward	  membership,	   as	  declared	  at	   the	  Bucharest	   summit	   in	  April	  2008,	  
was	  not	   at	   all	  welcomed	  by	  Russia.	   According	   to	   the	   International	   Crisis	  Group	   (2008),	  Russia	   had	  multiple	   aims:	   to	   punish	  Georgia	   for	   its	  NATO	  ambitions;	   to	  warn	  others,	  especially	  Ukraine;	  and	   to	  humiliate	  NATO	  by	  showing	  it	  to	  be	  indecisive	  and	  ineffective’. The	   importance	   of	   the	   EU’s	   capabilities	   for	   effective	   crisis	   management	  was	  highlighted	  in	  this	  occasion.	  The	  French	  presidency	  of	  the	  EU,	  headed	  by	  Nicolas	  Sarkozy,	  together	  with	  the	  Finnish	  OSCE	  chair	  was	  fundamental	  in	  editing	   the	  six-­‐point	  ceasefire	  plan	  agreed	  by	  both	  Russia	  and	  Georgia	  on	   the	  12th	  of	  August.	  This	  date	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  a	   turning	  point	   for	  the	  EU’s	  role	  in	  crisis	  management:	  the	  French	  mediation	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  EU	   was	   received	   as	   a	   success	   by	   European	   and	   international	   media	  (Delcour,	  2011). One	  month	   later,	   on	   the	  8th	   of	   September,	   an	   implementation	  agreement	  was	   signed	   by	   Moscow	   and	   Tbilisi,	   after	   an	   extraordinary	   European	  Council	   meeting	   gave	   full	   backing	   to	   the	   ceasefire	   agreement	   and	  committed	   the	   Union,	   “including	   through	   a	   presence	   on	   the	   ground,	   to	  support	  every	  effort	  to	  secure	  a	  peaceful	  and	  lasting	  solution	  to	  the	  conflict	  in	   Georgia”	   (Council	   of	   the	   European	   Union,	   2008).	   This	   statement	   was	  followed	   by	   the	   deployment	   of	   a	   civilian	   monitoring	   mission	   (EUMM),	  demonstrating	   the	   EU’s	   capability	   to	   act	   quickly	   in	   terms	   of	   decision-­‐	  making,	  financing	  and	  deployment. The	  EU	  Monitoring	  Mission	  in	  Georgia	  was	  launched	  on	  the	  1st	  of	  October	  2008,	   as	  mentioned	   above,	   as	   stated	   by	   the	   arrangements	   set	   out	   in	   the	  six-­‐point	   agreement	   between	   Georgia	   and	   Russia	   of	   the	   12th	   of	   August	  2008,	  as	  implemented	  by	  the	  agreement	  reached	  on	  the	  8th	  of	  September	  2008	  (Pirozzi,	  2012).	  The	  decision	  to	  deploy	  a	  civilian	  monitoring	  mission	  was	   taken	   the	   week	   after	   the	   agreement.	   Its	   mandate	   ranged	   from	  contributing	   to	   stabilisation,	   normalisation	   and	   confidence	   building	   to	  informing	   EU	   decision-­‐making	   on	   the	   situation	   in	   the	   field.	   The	  mission	  started	  with	  the	  recruitment	  of	  200	  monitors	  from	  different	  backgrounds. Right	  after	   the	  establishment	  of	   the	  EUMM,	   the	  EU’s	  presence	   in	  Georgia	  was	  played	  by	  four	  actors:	  EUMM;	  EU’s	  delegation	  in	  Tbilisi,	  the	  EU	  special	  Representative	  (EUSR)	  for	  the	  South	  Caucasus,	  appointed	  in	  2003;	  and	  the	  EUSR	  for	  the	  crisis	  in	  Georgia,	  appointed	  in	  September	  2008	  to	  represent	  the	   EU	   at	   the	   Geneva	   talks	   and	   facilitate	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  settlement	  plan	  between	  Georgia	  and	  Russia.	   It	   is	   important	  to	  underline	  that	   the	  political	  weight	  of	   the	  EU	   in	   the	  Geneva	   settlement	  negotiations	  
was	  considerably	  higher	  than	  it	  had	  been	  in	  previous	  occasions.	  Moreover,	  the	  2008	  report	  on	  the	  implementation	  of the	  ESS	  underlined	  specifically	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  conflicts	  in	  Georgia,	  emphasizing	  that	  “since	  2003,	  the	  EU	  has	  increasingly	  made	  a	  difference	  in	  addressing	  crisis	  and	  conflict,	  in	  places	  such	  as	  (...)	  Georgia”	  and	  pointing	  out	  that	  “the	  situation	  in	  Georgia,	  concerning	  Abkhazia	  and	  South	  Ossetia,	  has	  escalated,	  leading	  to	  an	  armed	  conflict	   between	   Russia	   and	   Georgia	   in	   August	   2008.	   The	   EU	   led	   the	  international	   response,	   through	   mediation	   between	   the	   parties,	  humanitarian	   assistance,	   a	   civilian	   monitoring	   mission,	   and	   substantial	  financial	  support”	  (Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  2008). However,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  said	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  EUSR	  and	  the	   EUMM	   has	   not	   been	   easy	   because	   of	   overlapping	   competences	   and	  functions.	   At	   this	   point,	   the	   High	   Representative	   for	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	  Security	   Policy,	   Catherine	   Ashton,	   decided	   to	   merge	   the	   two	   EUSR	  positions:	  Philippe	  Lefort	  was	  appointed	  EU	  Special	  Representative	  for	  the	  South	  Caucasus	  and	  the	  crisis	  in	  Georgia	  on	  the	  1st	  of	  September	  2011.	  The	  EUMM’s	  significance	  was	  enhanced	  because	  of	  its	  soon	  becoming	  the	  only	  internationally	  presence	   in	  Georgia	  after	  Russia	   forced	   the	  closure	  of	   the	  United	   Nation	   Mission	   (UNOMIG)	   in	   Abkhazia	   in	   2008	   and	   the	   OSCE	  Mission	  in	  South	  Ossetia	  in	  2009	  (Pirozzi,	  2012). One	  year	  after	  the	  Five-­‐Days	  war,	  in	  August	  2009,	  while	  the	  humanitarian	  assistance	  programmes	   run	  by	   the	  EU	  have	   continued	  quite	   successfully,	  the	  political	  process	  has	  stalled	  and	  Russia,	  shortly	  after	  President	  Obama	  visited	   Moscow	   and	   Tbilisi,	   restated	   the	   intention	   to	   protect	   the	   two	  separatist	   regions	   against	   a	   possible	   Georgian	   aggression,	   closing	   any	  possible	   resolution	   to	   the	   conflicts	   and	   sending	   a	   clear	   message	   to	   the	  western	  countries	  (Gordadze,	  2011).	  	  
EU’s	  Capabilities	  in	  Crisis	  Management	  
 At	  this	  point,	  EU	  civilian	  and	  military	  crisis	  management	  is	  still	  far	  from	  a	  complete	   success	   achieved	  by	   itself	   but	   it	   is	  working	   in	  order	   to	   achieve	  better	  results.	  	  According	   to	   many	   scholars,	   in	   order	   to	   face	   the	   security	   and	   defence	  challenges	   of	   this	   unstable	   world,	   it	   will	   be	   necessary	   to	   programme	  
coherent	  and	  strategic	  actions	  with	  the	  specific	  aim	  to	  achieve	  a	  definitive	  credibility	   in	   this	   role.	   An	   essential	   step	  will	   be	   the	   improvement	   of	   the	  European	   External	   Action	   Service	   enhancing	   the	   role	   of	   the	   High	  Representative,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   fragmentation	   and	   overlapping	  competences	  among	  the	  institutions,	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  effective	  and	  coherent	  management	  strategy	  instead	  of	  individual	  efforts	  made	  case	  by	   case.	   Whitman	   and	   Wolff	   (2012)	   suggest	   the	   implementation	   of	   a	  system	  built	  on	  three	  pillars:	  a	  definition	  of	  EU	  interests,	  capabilities	  and	  players;	  an	  assessment	  of	  EU	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  and	  clear	  ideas	  on	  how	  to	  work with	  these,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  exit	  points	  from	  the	  process.	  
 In	   order	   to	   enhance	   the	   EU’s	   credibility	   as	   a	   global	   actor,	  Whitman	   and	  Wolff	   created	   an	   analytical	   framework	   explaining	   the	   necessary	  capabilities	   that	   any	   crisis	   manager	   must	   possess.	   In	   particular,	   it	  underlines	  the	  EU’s	  achievements	  and	  lacks	  in	  strategic	  terms.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	   that	   this	  model	   can	  be	  applied	  on	  many	  operations	  cases	  and	  can	  help	  to	  draw	  credible	  conclusions	  on	  EU’s	  crisis	  management	  system	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  conflict	  scenarios. In	   order	   to	   succeed	   in	   conflict	   management,	   the	   EU	  must	   possess	   three	  sets	   of	   capabilities:	   capabilities	   to	   act,	   to	   fund	   and	   to	   cooperate	   and	  coordinate. 
Capabilities	   to	   act	   call	   the	   attention	   on	   appropriate	   policy	   tools	   and	   the	  ability	   to	   deploy	   them	   in	   the	   right	   time.	   In	   this	   case,	   political	   will	   is	   a	  determining	   factor.	   The	  EU	  progressed	   significantly	   since	   the	  Petersberg	  tasks	  were	   included	   in	   the	  Maastricht	   Treaty	   in	   1992.	  Moreover,	   on	   the	  institutional	  level,	  many	  progresses	  have	  been	  made	  too.	  Before	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty,	  an	  example	   is	   the	  appointment	  of	   the	  EU	  Special	  Representatives	  (EUSR),	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  diplomatic	  negotiations	  in	  conflict	  areas. Later,	   with	   the	   entry	   in	   force	   of	   the	   Lisbon	   Treaty,	   two	   important	  innovations	  were	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  High	  Representative	  of	  the	  European	  Union	   for	   Foreign	  Affairs	   and	   Security	  Policy	   and	   the	  European	  External	  Action	  Service	  (EEAS). 
Capabilities	  to	  fund:	  Capable	  of	  funding	  its	  efforts,	  possibly	  over	  extended	  periods.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  be	  able	  to	  fund	  operations	  both	  in	  short	  and	  long	  terms.	  The	  short	  term	  operations	  aim	  to	  prevent	  conflict	  and	  support	  post-­‐	  conflict	   political	   stabilisation.	   In	   addition,	   they	   provide	   support	   to	  activities	   such	   as	   development	   of	   democratic	   institutions,	   international	  
criminal	   tribunals,	  promotion	  of	   independent	  media	  and	  general	   support	  of	  civilian	  population. The	  long	  term	  operations	  aim	  to	  fight	  the	  proliferation	  of	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction,	   strengthen	   response	   of	   non-­‐EU	   members	   to	   cross-­‐border	  threats	  and	  enhance	  capacity	  building.	  A	  demonstration	  of	  EU’s	  capacity	  to	  deploy	  financial	  resources	  to	  deal	  with	  issues	  of	  conflict	  prevention,	  crisis	  management	  and	  peace	  building	  was	  the	   introduction	  of	   the	  Instruments	  for	  Stability	  (IfS). 
Capabilities	   to	   cooperate	   and	   coordinate:	   this	   set	   of	   capabilities	   can	   be	  divided	   in	   two	   dimensions.	   A	   horizontal	   dimension	   coordinating	   EU’s	  institutions	   involved	   in	   crisis	   management	   and	   a	   vertical	   dimension	  between	   EU	   as	   a	   supranational	   organization	   and	   the	   member	   states.	  Moreover,	   at	   the	   external	   level,	   this	   capability	   is	   essential	   in	   the	  relationship	   with	   NATO	   and	   with	   third	   countries	   and	   international	  organisations	   because	   of	   the	   strong	   European	   commitment	   to	   a	  multilateral	  approach. According	   to	   Whitman	   and	   Wolff	   (2012)	   the	   EU	   has	   impressively	  enhanced	  its	  capabilities	  both	  to	  act	  and	  to	  fund	  its	  actions.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	   mission	   in	   Georgia	   in	   2008,	   as	   mentioned	   above,	   two	   EU	   Special	  Representatives,	  for	  the	  South	  Caucasus	  and	  for	  the	  crisis	  in	  Georgia,	  have	  been	   appointed;	   the	   European	   Neighbourhood	   Policy	   and	   the	   Easter	  Partnership	   have	   officially	   made	   conflict	   management	   one	   of	   their	  priorities. In	   terms	   of	   identification	   of	   strengths	   and	   weaknesses	   of	   the	   EU	   as	   an	  actor	   in	   crisis	   management,	   Tocci	   (2012:	   143-­‐7)	   presents	   interesting	  findings.	   Among	   the	   EU	   strengths,	   she	   includes	   the	   use	   of	   policies	   of	  conditionality:	   the	   promise/threat	   or	   granting/infliction	   of	   a	  benefit/punishment	   in	   return	   for	   the	   fulfillment/violation	   of	   a	  predetermined	   condition	   can	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   strategy	   which	   is	  typical	  not	  only	  of	  the	  EU	  but	  of	  mediators	  in	  general. The	  advantage	  is	  that	  the	  EU	  can	  offer	  a	  more	  varied	  range	  of	  benefits	  and	  punishments	   compared	   to	   other	   mediators.	   For	   example,	   trade	  preferences,	   financial	  and	   technical	  assistance,	   cooperation	   in	   fields	   such	  as	   science,	   environment,	   culture	   and	   education,	   energy,	   infrastructure,	  inclusion	   in	   EU	   programmes	   and	   agencies	   and,	   most	   important,	   the	  possibility	  of	  a	  full	  membership.	  Another	  point	  of	  strength	  is	  identified	  in	  
the	   European	   propensity	   to	   induce	   resolutions	   through	   socialization	  inducing	  a	  voluntary	  transformation	  of	  the	  perceived	  interests. The	   EU	   develops	   this	   system	   through	   dialogue	   with	   third	   states	   in	   the	  context	   of	   contractual	   relations.	   Also,	   she	   recognizes	   that	   the	   EU	   can	  promote	  crisis	  management	  solutions	  through	  the	  passive	  enforcement	  of	  rules	  and	  norms,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  far	  easier	  to	  put	  in	  act	  as	  there	  must	  be	  a	  set	  of	  legally	  defined	  rules	  embedded	  in	  EU	  contracts	  with	  third	  states. Tocci	   also	   indicates	   a	   set	  of	  weaknesses.	   In	  particular,	   she	  highlights	   the	  European	   inability	   to	   act	   rapidly	   and	   coherently	   and	   its	   limited	  capabilities.	   It	   is	   no	   secret	   that	   EU	   is	   frequently	   unable	   to	   build	   a	  consensus	  among	  member	  states	  especially	  because	  the	  latter	  are	  not	  keen	  to	  give	  away	  part	  of	  their	  sovereignty.	  Another	  weakness	  is	  identified	  as	  a	  lack	   of	   credibility	   causing	   a	   partial	   delivery	   of	   EU	   potential	   in	   crisis	  management.	   It	   mostly	   depends	   on	   third	   state’s	   perception	   of	   the	   EU’s	  capacities:	   if	   the	   perception	   is	   negative	   then	   the	   EU	   will	   also	   lose	  effectiveness.	   In	   this	   case	   credibility	   is	   related	   to	   the	   track	   record	   in	  granting/withdrawing	  promised	  benefits	  when	  and	  only	   if	   the	  conditions	  are	  fulfilled/violated.	  
 
Conclusions	  
 The	   EU	   can	   be	   considered	   a	   latecomer	   on	   the	   stage	   of	   the	   crisis	  management	  and	   this	   could	  be	  a	   significant	   reason	  why	   it	   faces	  so	  many	  difficulties	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  a	  role. According	  to	  a	  report	  from	  International	  Crisis	  Group,	  the	  EU	  is	  still	  trying	  to	  overcome	  different	  opinions	  among	  the	  member	  states.	  The	  conflicts	  in	  Georgia	  are	  a	  really	  good	  example:	  on	  one	  hand,	  countries	  like	  France	  and	  Germany	   prefer	   bilateral	   relations	   with	   Russia	   over	   a	   common	   EU	  approach,	  while,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  there	  is	  another	  block	  (including	  Baltic	  states	   and	   Poland)	   which	   prioritize	   a	   common	   approach.	   This	   double	  vision	  has	   caused	  a	   lack	  of	   coherence	  and	   strategy	   in	   foreign	  policy	  and,	  consequently,	  an	  insufficient	  action	  in	  crisis	  prevention. The	  case	  of	  Georgia	  has	  been	  selected	  because,	   in	  my	  opinion,	  represents	  not	   yet	   a	   complete	   success	   but	   definitely	   a	   turning	   point	   in	   EU	   crisis	  
management,	   a	   new	   start	   to	   programme	   coherent	   and	   strategic	   actions	  and	  to	  achieve	  better	  results	  and	  eventually	  a	  definitive	  credibility	  in	  this	  role.	   The	   European	   Union	   Monitoring	   Mission	   (EUMM)	   in	   Georgia	   is	   an	  autonomous	  mission	   led	   by	   the	   EU	   under	   the	   EU	   Common	   security	   and	  defence	  policy	  (CSDP).	  Once	  ended	  the	  UN	  and	  OSCE	  monitoring	  missions,	  EUMM	   is	   now	   the	   only	   international	  monitoring	  mission	   in	  Georgia.	   The	  mission	   is	   still	   ongoing,	   a	   characteristic	   that	   allows	   an	   opportunity	   for	  observation	  and	  comment.	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